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Abstract
Why does political resistance to foreign takeovers vary across countries and over time? 
Rational choice accounts of economic nationalism fail to provide an answer. The pres-
ent article proposes an institutionalist amendment in the “Varieties of Capitalism” tra-
dition. While politicians everywhere face incentives to favor local stakeholders over 
anonymous shareholders, stakeholder opposition to foreign takeovers depends on how 
much of a threat foreign owners pose to network-based coordination. Networks are 
worth fighting for only where they are actually in use. In so-called outsider systems 
of corporate governance, including the UK, coordination takes place mainly through 
market-based mechanisms, and even domestic owners do not rely on networks. Politi-
cal mobilization is weaker under these conditions. A comparison of Britain and France 
from the 1970s onward illustrates the argument.
Zusammenfassung
Warum unterscheidet sich politischer Widerstand gegen ausländische Übernahmen 
von Land zu Land und im zeitlichen Verlauf? Rational-Choice-Ansätze zum Thema 
Wirtschaftsnationalismus geben auf diese Frage keine Antwort. Das vorliegende Papier 
schlägt eine institutionalistische Ergänzung in der „Varieties-of-Capitalism“-Tradition 
vor. Während Politiker überall mit dem Anreiz konfrontiert sind, lokale Interessen-
gruppen (Stakeholder) gegenüber anonymen Aktionären zu bevorzugen, hängt der Wi-
derstand der Stakeholder gegen ausländische Übernahmen davon ab, in welchem Maß 
ausländische Eigentümer eine Gefahr für die netzwerkbasierte Koordination darstellen. 
Für Netzwerke zu kämpfen lohnt sich nur, wenn diese auch tatsächlich genutzt werden. 
In sogenannten Outsider-Systemen der Unternehmensführung – darunter Großbritan-
nien – erfolgt die Koordination über marktbasierte Mechanismen und selbst inländi-
sche Eigentümer sind nicht auf Netzwerke angewiesen. Unter diesen Umständen fällt 
die politische Mobilisierung schwächer aus. Ein Vergleich zwischen Großbritannien 
und Frankreich seit den 1970ern veranschaulicht das Argument.
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Callaghan: Motives for Political Resistance to Foreign Takeovers 1
Economic Nationalism, Network-based Coordination, and 
the Market for Corporate Control: Motives for Political 
Resistance to Foreign Takeovers
“Every week, a bland announcement confirms the sale of another major British institution to a 
foreign predator and, bizarrely, no one is complaining.” 
Tom Bower, The Guardian, February 9, 2007
1 Introduction
International market integration reduces the overlap between economic and political 
borders and thereby potentially undermines itself (cf. Clift/Woll 2012: 308). Politicians 
face temptations to engage in protectionism1 on behalf of local constituents, because 
foreign trading partners have no vote. To prevent spirals of retaliation, they voluntarily 
tie their own hands by delegating the maintenance of free trade to non-elected bodies 
such as the European Commission or the World Trade Organization. However, despite 
such agreements, the spatial incongruence between open borders and territorially de-
fined democratic mandates persists, forcing governments “to balance economic expan-
sion with political priorities” (World Economic Forum 2007: 4).
The market for corporate control exemplifies the political difficulty of maintaining eco-
nomic openness. While the vast majority of cross-national mergers and acquisitions pass 
without protest,2 many governments still intervene in high-profile cases, either by block-
ing the takeover directly or by promoting “patriotic” mergers as an alternative to foreign 
acquisition (see Kim 2007; Hill 2010). Since 2005, several OECD countries – including 
France, Japan, Canada and the US – have even strengthened the legal instruments avail-
able for the defense of “strategic sectors” (see Brown/Kilby 2011; Hill 2010). Such trends 
led the Economist Intelligence Unit (2007) to register concern that the gradual lowering 
of barriers to foreign takeovers around the world might be going into reverse.
1 I use the terms “protectionism,” “economic nationalism,” and “economic patriotism” loosely 
and interchangeably to denote political intervention that privileges resident insiders over non-
resident outsiders. No value judgment is intended. For a discussion of differences in the territo-
rial scope, policy content, and normative connotations sometimes associated with these terms, 
see Clift and Woll (2012: 312–318).
2 Between 1986 and 2005, 3,386 British companies and 1,374 French companies were the target 
of cross-border mergers or acquisitions (Garita/van Marrewijk 2008). The number of unsolic-
ited (“hostile”) foreign bids between 1991 and 2005 amounts to 34 in Britain and 18 in France 
(Thomson Financial Platinum Database).
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Puzzlingly, however, some governments are more willing than others to embrace cross-
border trade of corporate control. Britain in particular is exceptionally open to foreign 
takeovers. In 2005/6, while the French government celebrated “economic patriotism” 
and passed new laws in response to mere rumors that PepsiCo might bid for Danone, 
Tony Blair endorsed the sale of Britain’s defense industry and boasted that 10 Downing 
Street sourced its water and electricity from French and German suppliers.3 With only 
minor variations, a welcoming attitude toward foreign-owned transnationals has char-
acterized British industrial policy throughout much of the post-war period (see Jones 
1990; Sugden 1990; Capie/Wood/Sensenbrenner 2005).
Long-standing research on the politics of open markets suggests variation in resource 
endowments as an obvious explanation (Gourevitch 1986; Rogowski 1989; Keohane/
Milner 1996; Hiscox 2002). Although developed with regard to trade in goods, resource 
endowment theories easily travel to the market for corporate control. Europe’s finan-
cial services industry, which earns its money by arranging and financing mergers and 
acquisitions, is heavily concentrated in the City of London. In 2007, financial services 
accounted for 4 percent of total UK employment, 15 percent of income tax and 26.5 
percent of corporation tax (Morgan 2012: 379). It stands to reason that British govern-
ments should pay greater attention to the demands of financial sector interest groups 
than should governments in other countries, where financial services contribute less to 
overall economic performance.
However, these and other IPE explanations cannot account for a striking peculiarity in 
the structure of recent British political debate. The economic weight of the City may ex-
plain why British governments support open markets for corporate control, but it does 
not explain why backbenchers and opposition parties have ceased to speak up for the 
victims of cross-border takeovers. Surely, liberal economic ideas have not penetrated 
the British electorate to the point of converting everyone. Nor is it plausible that the 
workers and managers of target companies subjugate their own immediate interests 
to the greater good of a thriving financial sector. Why, then, is the bashing of “foreign 
raiders” no longer pursued as a vote-winning strategy in the UK? External political 
pressure associated with the European Commission’s efforts to promote active markets 
for corporate control (see Callaghan/Höpner 2005) affects Britain no more than France. 
Suggestions that British voters and politicians are culturally less hostile toward foreign 
influences are belied by persistent British resistance to European political integration. 
Britain does have a weaker tradition of state intervention in industrial policy, but this 
observation merely shifts the burden of explanation. Why are British governments 
more reluctant than their French counterparts to pursue an activist industrial policy, 
including intervention in the market for corporate control?
3 The Times, March 24, 2006.
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I argue that Britain’s “outsider-oriented” system of corporate governance is key to re-
solving the puzzle. While politicians everywhere have incentives to serve local stake-
holders, the interests of these stakeholders differ across corporate governance systems 
due to variation in the importance of network-based coordination. So-called outsider 
systems, including the British, rely mainly on market-based coordination. In such sys-
tems, foreign acquisitions cause less disruption to business-as-usual for workers, man-
agers, and policy-makers, because even domestic owners do not rely on networks. Low 
reliance on network-based coordination thus reduces the political incentives to mobi-
lize against foreign ownership.
In essence, the paper advances a “varieties of capitalism” perspective to highlight one of 
many gaps in simple rational choice accounts. Economic nationalism is a multifaceted 
phenomenon that does not lend itself to monocausal explanations. Rather than replace 
one oversimplified explanation with another, I merely identify one hitherto neglected 
institutional variable that helps account for some gaps in incentive-based explanations 
without recourse to constructivist perspectives that also offer valuable insights (e.g. 
Helleiner/Pickel 2005). 
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews rational choice accounts of takeover 
patriotism and proposes an institutionalist amendment, by explaining how the degree 
of reliance on network-based coordination shapes political incentives to oppose for-
eign takeovers. Section 3 documents cross-national variation in political opposition by 
comparing French and British government action regarding foreign takeovers from the 
1980s onwards. Section 4 provides quantitative measures of network-based coordina-
tion in Britain and France. Section 5 presents anecdotal qualitative evidence that sup-
ports a causal connection. The conclusion discusses political implications and offers 
suggestions for further research. 
2 Theory
Rational choice accounts explain political hostility to takeover bids by pointing to the 
incentives associated with an imperfect overlap between shareholders and citizens. The 
argument is not limited to foreign bids but applies most forcefully to them. Coffee 
(1999: 656) explicitly suggests that political resistance to takeovers may grow as capital 
markets become more complete, because the incentives to support anti-takeover mea-
sures that protect local jobs grow as the costs of such action fall increasingly on foreign 
shareholders.
The general argument rests on two assertions. First, politicians are said to favor stake-
holders over shareholders because the former vote in well-defined constituencies. Hell-
wig (2000: 124) argues that 
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stakeholders are easier to identify and see as actual people because they tend to be concentrated 
in certain locations, with little intention to move if they can help it. Outside shareholders in 
contrast tend to be dispersed. Their identities and locations change with every stock market 
transaction. 
Roe (1993: 332–333) draws on Mancur Olson to argue that “[o]ut-of-state raiders are 
less organized than in-state targets: they might sit back or do little. And out-of-state 
institutions are less influential in a state; politicians respond first to their constituents.” 
For Romano (1987: 140), takeover regulation is a classic example of an externality- 
imposing statute because “non-residents, who cannot meaningfully interpose their 
views in the legislative process, bear the costs.”
Second, the stakeholders supposedly favored by politicians are said to dislike outside 
owners because the latter disrupt network-based coordination. As Hellwig (2000: 130) 
explains, “outsiders are difficult to fit into informal mechanisms of give and take.” In-
formal coordination is attractive because it saves transaction costs, but it requires re-
peated interaction in a context where everybody knows how to punish defectors. “Out-
siders naturally generate mistrust – one does not know how to deal with them through 
informal mechanisms. This makes it tempting to exclude them from any significant 
influence” (Hellwig 2000: 129–130). In the market for corporate control, informal give 
and take can encourage companies to 
hold reserves to smooth over potential future difficulties and delay or sweeten needed adjust-
ments. To the extent that layoffs affect not just the workers, but the entire community, shop-
keepers, real estate owners, and the government itself, this interest is actually shared by all of 
“Main Street.” (Hellwig 2000: 124)
A major problem with this parsimonious account is its failure to explain variation across 
countries and over time. As documented below, British political resistance to foreign 
takeovers has ceased almost entirely in recent decades, while French governments con-
tinue to intervene. The degree of overlap between shareholders and citizens does not 
vary sufficiently to account for the contrast.4 Nor do British politicians have weaker in-
centives to serve local interests. On the contrary, in view of the British electoral system 
with its single member constituencies, one would expect the opposite (Rogowski 1987).
The present article addresses the puzzle by offering an institutionalist amendment to the 
simple rational choice account. While politicians everywhere have incentives to serve 
local stakeholders, the interests of these stakeholders differ across corporate governance 
systems due to variation in the importance of network-based coordination.
4 Between 1977 and 2006, foreign ownership of domestic listed companies increased dramatically 
in both countries, from 12 percent to 32 percent in France and from 6 percent to 40 percent in 
the UK (Deutsches Aktieninstitut 2008: table 08.7).
Callaghan: Motives for Political Resistance to Foreign Takeovers 5
Comparative research on corporate governance systems commonly distinguishes be-
tween insider and outsider systems (Vitols 2001). Both systems address the principal–
agent problems that arise where companies are not managed by their owners, but they 
do so in different ways. In insider systems, large, stable blockholdings represent the 
dominant form of corporate ownership. Large blockholders have strong incentives to 
devote time to monitoring managerial decisions. They also control the necessary voting 
power to directly influence the composition of company boards if they are dissatisfied 
with managerial performance. Network-based monitoring devices such as interlocking 
directorships, corporate cross-shareholdings and personal ties among managerial and 
financial elites are widespread under these conditions. In outsider systems, by contrast, 
ownership is less stable and more dispersed. As a result, individual shareholders have 
weaker incentives and fewer instruments to directly control managerial decisions. In-
stead, they rely mainly on arms-length market mechanisms to monitor and punish. The 
share price serves as the main indicator of managerial performance. Perceived under-
performance is punished by a drop in market value and increased threat of hostile take-
over, as dissatisfied owners sell their shares.
Outsider systems are less conducive to informal, network-based coordination because 
their reliance on exit rather than voice reduces the likelihood of repeated interaction; 
channels for informal communication are less developed, and their lack of transparency 
is frowned upon as market-distorting; and, most importantly, managers are not free to 
build up reserves that could help protect jobs during temporary economic downturns, 
because they are under constant pressure to deliver short-term shareholder value.
As a result of these differences in the significance of network-based coordination, the 
political incentives for opposing foreign takeovers also vary across countries. In out-
sider systems, where, regardless of nationality, managers and owners cannot credibly 
commit to delivering their part of the bargain in informal arrangements of give and 
take, politicians, workers and other stakeholders have less reason to mobilize against 
foreign takeovers.
To assess this argument empirically, the following sections map British and French take-
over patriotism against several indicators of outsider-oriented corporate governance 
from the 1970s onward.
3 Cross-national variation in takeover patriotism
Political intervention in the market for corporate control is difficult to measure, not 
least because it is often either covert or ambiguously cloaked. For example, the referral 
of a foreign bid to a commission charged with assessing the danger of monopolistic 
market domination may be motivated either by genuine competition concerns or by 
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Table 1 Examples of direct government attempts to prevent foreign takeovers
Year Bidder (nationality) Target Sector Means of intervention
France
1976 American National 
Distillers (US)
Chateau Margeaux Alcoholic drinks ?
1977 ? (UK) Rousselot Gelatine ?
? (Netherlands) Gardinier Fertilizers ?
1980 Thorn Electrical 
Industries (UK)
Locatel Consumer 
electronics
Arrangement of a French 
counterbid
1986 ? n-2 Food processing Arrangement of a French 
counterbid
1988 Pearson (UK) Les Echos Newspapers Veto on public interest 
grounds
1988 Nestle (Switzerland) French subsidiaries 
of Rowntree 
Mackintosh
Food Veto on competition 
grounds
1988 Carlo de Benedetti 
(Italy)
Epeda Automotive 
supplier
Arrangement of a French 
counterbid
1991 Nestle (Switzerland) Perrier Mineral water ? (intervention ineffective)
? ? Groupe Bull Consumer 
electronics (?)
? (intervention ineffective)
1999 Ente Nazionale 
Idrocarburi (ENI) (Italy)
Elf Oil Arrangement of a French 
counterbid
1999 Any foreign bidder Crédit Lyonnais Banking Expression of opposition
1999 Any foreign bidder Canal Plus Broadcasting ?
1999 Any foreign bidder Cegetel Telecoms ?
2003 Novartis (Switzerland) Aventis Pharmaceuticals Arrangement of a French 
counterbid
2005 PepsiCo (US) Danone Food Expression of opposition; 
new legislation
2006 Mittal (India) Arcelor Steel Expression of opposition 
(ineffective)
2007 Siemens (Germany) Areva Nuclear energy 
operator
Encouragement of a 
French counterbid
United Kingdom
1981 Any foreign bidder ICL Computers Expression of opposition
1982 Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (HSBC)
Royal Bank of 
Scotland
Banking Government veto
1988 Kuwait Investment 
Office
British Petroleum Oil Referral to Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission 
on public interest grounds
1988 Elders IXL (Australia) Scottish & Newcastle 
Breweries
? Referral to Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission, 
officially on competition 
grounds 
? = Could not be determined by the author.
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the desire to exclude foreigners, and even where competition concerns are subsequently 
dismissed, the delays associated with a referral can suffice to stall a bid. Moreover, the 
line between rhetoric and action is blurry, because the mere threat of intervention can 
serve as a deterrent. As a result, the number of bids that failed is a misleading indicator 
of government activism, and bids that never happened are impossible to count. Con-
versely, instances of non-intervention are as hard to pin down as dogs that do not bark, 
because there is no objective way of identifying cases that should have provoked a pro-
tectionist response.
Despite these difficulties, it is clear that French and British governments have long occu-
pied opposite extremes on a spectrum of political action regarding foreign takeovers. The 
following examples of direct government intervention, summarized in Table 1, are drawn 
from an extensive Lexis Nexis search of English-language newspapers from 1975 onward. 
Earlier years are not covered by Lexis Nexis. Given that the names of the companies con-
cerned were not known in advance, the initial search terms were inevitably vague (for 
example, “foreign takeover” AND [France OR Britain]). Subsequent searches within the 
results, using terms such as “government,” “politic*,” “national,” and “protection*,” may 
not have filtered out all the examples mentioned in Lexis Nexis newspapers, and these 
newspapers may not have reported all actual instances of intervention. Nevertheless, 
while far from complete, Table 1 contains the most comprehensive list available to date.
French governments took direct action against foreign takeovers at least 18 times since 
the mid-1970s. In 1976, under Giscard d’Estaing (president)/Chirac (prime minister), 
the government prevented the sale of Chateau Margaux, “one of the aristocrats of the 
Bordeaux vineyards,” to the American National Distillers group, and announced mea-
sures to help the food processing industry resist foreign takeovers.5 In 1977, Giscard 
d’Estaing/Barre stopped Rousselot, the world leader in gelatine, and Gardinier, a pri-
vately owned diversified fertilizer company, from being taken over by British and Dutch 
companies, respectively.6
British observers were already bored with the practice by 1980, when Giscard d’Estaing/
Barre prevented Britain’s Thorn Electrical Industries from buying Locatel, France’s big-
gest TV rental company and instead prodded two French companies, Thomson group 
and Compagnie Générale d’Électricité, into coming up with an alternative bid.7 The 
Economist wrote that “[t]he French government has dashed in to rescue a vital industry 
from a foreign takeover. Sounds familiar? It has been a common enough refrain in the 
past.”8 The mid-1980s possibly saw a temporary decline in French government inter-
vention. One observer remarked that, in January 1988, 
5 The Economist, August 21, 1976: 86.
6  Business Week, October 3, 1977: 56.
7 The Economist, March 1, 1980: 64.
8 The Economist, March 1, 1980: 64.
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[e]ven the sale to a Canadian group of Martell, a 273-year-old family-controlled cognac house 
which by any definition qualifies as part of the national heritage, was approved … with scarcely 
a hesitation. Finance ministry officials made it clear they would have been embarrassed to be 
seen blocking foreign takeovers while French firms were buying and bidding outside France.9
However, even during this supposedly more open period, Mitterrand/Chirac in 1986 
asked large French agricultural concerns and banks to mobilize capital to prevent for-
eign takeover of the n-2 sugar company and other French agro-food groups.10 In 1988, 
the observer cited above diagnosed a “strong return to the feeling that French groups 
need to be protected against outside predators,” when Pierre Beregovoy, finance minis-
ter under Mitterrand/Rocard, proposed the creation of a fund to help managers defend 
their companies against hostile bidders.11 The same year, under Mitterrand/Chirac, the 
government vetoed a takeover of Les Echos, a French financial daily, by the London-
based publisher Pearson.12 Concerns over foreign domination of the food industry led 
antitrust officials to prevent Swiss chocolate maker Nestlé from taking over French sub-
sidiaries as part of its bid for British candy manufacturer Rowntree Mackintosh.13 To 
prevent the Italian financier Carlo De Benedetti in October from buying Epeda, an 
automotive supplier, French bureaucrats lined up an offer from a group that included 
carmaker Peugeot.14 Efforts by Mitterrand/Cresson to prevent a foreign takeover of 
Perrier and significant foreign holdings in Groupe Bull, France’s state-owned computer 
company, did not fail for lack of trying,15 but they exposed limits to French state inter-
ventionism. Whether the subsequent period of low political intervention owes more to 
a temporary drop in the number of cross-border mergers than to a new reluctance to 
intervene is impossible to discern. In any case, it did not endure. In 1999, the govern-
ment led by Chirac/Jospin opposed a merger between Elf and Italy’s dominant oil com-
pany, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), and discouraged Elf from looking for a foreign 
partner who could act as a “white knight” to stave off a hostile bid from its French 
rival Total. In 2002, Chirac/Raffarin signaled that only French bidders need apply to 
take over Crédit Lyonnais16 and prevented the media conglomerate Vivendi Universal 
from selling its French film and television unit Canal Plus and French mobile telecom 
unit Cegetel abroad. In 2003, they discouraged Switzerland’s Novartis from bidding 
for Aventis and instead arranged for Aventis to merge with the formerly state-owned 
French company Sanofi-Synthélabo.17 In 2006, speculation that PepsiCo was preparing 
9 The Financial Post (Toronto), April 12, 1988: 12.
10 The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, November 22, 1986.
11 The Financial Post (Toronto), April 12, 1988: 12.
12 Sydney Morning Herald (Australia), February 24, 1988: 46.
13 Business Week, November 21, 1988: 57.
14 Business Week, November 21, 1988: 57.
15 The Economist, June 1, 1991: 89; The Jerusalem Post, March 6, 1992.
16 Daily Deal/The Deal, July 14, 2003.
17 The International Herald Tribune, April 30, 2004: 13.
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a bid for the food conglomerate Groupe Danone led Sarkozy/Villepin to issue a new 
decree granting the French government a right to veto or impose conditions on foreign 
takeovers of French firms in 11 sectors deemed strategic to the economy.18
In 2006, the hint of a bid for the Suez conglomerate from Italy’s privatized electricity 
company, Enel, made Chirac/Villepin drop their opposition to a long-planned merger 
between privately owned Suez and nationalized Gaz de France.19 The same year, they 
vainly opposed Anglo-Indian Mittal Steel’s purchase of the partly French-owned steel 
maker Arcelor.20 In 2007 newly-elected President Sarkozy tried to engineer a merger 
of nuclear operator Areva with engineering group Alstom to squeeze out Germany’s 
Siemens.21 Three counterexamples should not go unmentioned, but the first foreign 
takeover of a French bank – Credit Commercial de France – by the British HSBC Hold-
ings in 2001, the takeover of French aluminum giant Pechiney by Canada’s Alcan in 
2003, and the 2006 merger between Euronext and the New York Stock Exchange are 
exceptions that prove the rule.22
British governments, by contrast, have shown remarkable openness toward foreign in-
vestment. The Lexis Nexis search produced only four reported instances of direct inter-
vention, all during Margaret Thatcher’s time in office. In 1981, the Industry Department 
indicated that it would “seek to oppose any predatory takeover by a foreign company 
for ICL,” a large computer manufacturer.23 In 1982, the government vetoed the takeover 
of The Royal Bank of Scotland by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
(HSBC) as contravening the public interest.24 In 1988, it referred the Kuwait Investment 
Office’s 22.5 percent stake in British Petroleum (BP) to the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (MMC) because of objections to BP coming under the influence of an 
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) member state.25 Some com-
mentators also suspected protectionist motives behind the 1988 MMC referral of a bid 
by Elders, the Australian brewer, for Scottish & Newcastle Breweries, even though the 
bid was officially referred on competition grounds.26 Intervention seems to have ceased 
completely since 1989, when Nicholas Ridley, then Trade and Industry Secretary, an-
nounced that the government would henceforth refrain from blocking foreign bids for 
any privatized company that did not involve strategic defense interests.27
18 Daily Deal/The Deal, January 9, 2006.
19 The Economist, February 10, 2007.
20 The Economist, July 1, 2006.
21 The Guardian, October 24, 2007.
22 See Callaghan/Lagneau-Ymonet (2011) for a detailed analysis of the political discourse regard-
ing the NYSE-Euronext merger.
23 Financial Times, May 6, 1981: 7.
24 The Guardian, July 4, 2006, features: 10.
25 The Toronto Star, May 12, 1988: D28.
26 The Times, November 13, 1988.
27 The Guardian, December 14, 1989.
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Recent British governments have even permitted foreign takeovers in the defense sec-
tors, as well as in other areas heavily protected in other countries. Examples include the 
purchase of Racal’s defense electronics business by the French group Thomson CSF in 
2000,28 the sale of a controlling stake in AugustaWestland, Britain’s last helicopter maker, 
to the Italian defense and aerospace company Finmeccanica in 2004.29 In the same year, 
the Office of Fair Trading also gave the green light to the takeover of Alvis, Britain’s last 
remaining tank maker, by General Dynamics, the American defense contractor.30 (Note, 
though, that the company ended up remaining British after a successful counterbid by 
British Aerospace Engineering [BAE]). The public utilities were equally fair game for 
foreign bidders. In 1999, the Blair administration approved Enron’s bid for Wessex Water 
and Texas Utilities’ bid for Energy group.31 In 2008, Electricité de France acquired Brit-
ish Energy. Companies with strong symbolic value did not spark economic patriotism 
either. In 2002, Blair’s government relaxed foreign ownership limits on BAE Systems and 
Rolls-Royce by removing the 49.5 percent limit on aggregate foreign holdings for the two 
companies.32 In 2006, it endorsed the sale of the London Stock Exchange to America’s 
Nasdaq exchange after more than 300 years of British ownership.33 (Note, though, that 
LSE shareholders later rejected Nasdaq’s offer as too low.)34 In early 2010, despite an 
impending general election, it permitted Kraft’s takeover of chocolate maker Cadbury.
Even more striking than the laissez-faire stance of British governments is the “lack of 
political hue and cry.”35 Except for the occasional exasperated commentator, “no one is 
complaining. … The opposition is mute.”36 John Monks, a former leader of the Trades 
Union Congress, complained in 2006 that the Conservatives and UKIP had “a lot to 
say when there is the merest hint of a little more shared sovereignty at European level. 
But on the unfettered sale of our key national assets, they are dumb.” Conservative 
shadow chancellor George Osborne assured the 2006 CBI conference that a Conserva-
tive Government would never block foreign takeovers or shelter national champions,37 
and Vince Cable, his liberal counterpart, declared in 2007 that “[t]here is no room for 
nationalism and protectionism in a modern economy.”38 More notably, support ex-
tended to backbench Members of Parliament from constituencies that were affected by 
foreign takeovers. Upon news that TBI, owner of Cardiff airport and the second largest 
company in Wales, would be bought by French investors, Plaid Cymru, the Welsh na-
tionalist party, professed “no objections to any company takeover as long as they invest 
28 The Economist, July 20, 2002, survey: 6.
29 Financial Times, August 24, 2005: 7.
30 Sunday Times, May 30, 2004: 11.
31 The Independent, September 11, 1998: 6.
32 Flight International, April 2, 2002: 25.
33 The Evening Standard, December 12, 2006: 22.
34 The Daily Telegraph, February 14, 2007.
35 Sunday Times, May 30, 2004: 11.
36 Guardian, February 9, 2007: 37.
37 The Daily Telegraph, November 28, 2006: 44.
38 The Guardian, July 26, 2007: 32.
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in our infrastructure and transport links.”39 The 2005 takeover of Pilkington by its Japa-
nese competitor Nippon met with a similarly pragmatic response from Dave Watts and 
Shaun Woodward, the Labour MPs representing the constituency in which Pilkington 
was based. Watts explained that 
[t]he question of whether a foreign takeover of a British firm is a good thing or a bad thing 
depends on who is taking over and what the implications are … [T]there could actually be a 
positive impact in jobs if it meant extra investment coming in … Pilkington has been doing 
quite well in recent years … It could do even better under a new owner.40
In 2010, Senior Tory MP Bill Wiggin went even further to condemn protests against 
the takeover by Kraft of a Cadbury plant located in his Herefordshire constituency. He 
accused protesting workers of putting their own jobs at risk “by sending out such nega-
tive signals” and expressed doubts on whether anyone would want “to hire a whingeing 
workforce when you can have a positive upbeat one.”41 The Kraft-Cadbury takeover, in 
the run-up to a general election, did stir some protest, partly because Kraft announced a 
plant closure seven days after the bid had gone through, having previously promised to 
keep all plants open. Overall, however, the debate sparked off by the takeover centered 
around the problem of short-termism, rather than on the nationality of the bidders. As 
business minister Ian Lucas put it, “[t]he concern [was] not over who owns the com-
pany, but the nature of that ownership.”42
As shown in the following section, the stark contrast in French and British attitudes to-
ward foreign takeovers correlates with striking cross-national differences in the degree 
to which companies rely on network-based coordination. 
4 Quantitative evidence: Reliance on network-based coordination in French 
and British corporate governance
To measure the degree of network-based coordination, the present paper relies on sev-
eral different indicators, including ownership concentration, the proportion of shares 
held by long-term investors (families, the state, non-financial companies), managerial 
ties to the state apparatus, and intra-managerial networks (through interlocking direc-
torships and old school ties). Ownership concentration matters because large block-
holders are easier to coordinate with than are dispersed shareholders, not least because 
they often have direct access to government officials. Ownership stability matters be-
cause repeated interaction is essential for the credibility of commitments, allowing trust 
39 Financial Times, August 15, 2001: 18.
40 Daily Post (Liverpool), November 16, 2005: 8, 9.
41 Birmingham Evening Mail, January 22, 2010: 5.
42 Ian Lucas, cited in Birmingham Mail, January 27, 2010.
12 MPIfG Discussion Paper 12/10
to build up over time and facilitating punishment in case of defection. Managerial ties 
to the state apparatus affect the willingness of corporate executives to share their exper-
tise with and implement industrial policy measures devised by public officials. All these 
institutional features affect politicians’ incentives to oppose foreign takeovers, because 
network-based coordination with incumbent corporate elites is only worth preserving 
where it works. The strength of horizontal, intra-managerial networks (through inter-
locking directorships or old school ties), is less relevant to the functionality of verti-
cal coordination between government officials and corporate elites. Nevertheless, it is 
included as a measure, because it affects managers’ incentives to collectively mobilize 
against foreign takeovers, through their employer organizations.
Judging from the available data, cross-national variation in the importance of network-
based coordination closely corresponds to the above-documented cross-national varia-
tion in political resistance to foreign takeovers. Systematic time series data are, unfor-
tunately, not available for many of the indicators, but while data for individual years 
can be difficult to compare over time due to variation in sampling techniques, the stark 
contrast across countries is visible in all studies.
Ownership concentration of listed companies has been far lower in Britain than in 
France throughout the period under consideration (see Table 2). The proportion of Brit-
ish listed companies with a controlling blockholder at the 50 percent threshold (in other 
words, a single shareholder owning at least 50 percent of shares) was already below 10 
percent in 1951 (Florence 1961: 69) and has remained so ever since (Becht/Mayer 2001: 
2; Van der Elst 2004; Berglöf 1990: 126). In 1990, only 16 percent of British listed compa-
nies had a controlling blockholder at the 25 percent threshold, compared to 80 percent of 
French companies (Becht/Mayer 2001: 2). In 1996, less than 40 percent of British listed 
companies had a controlling blockholder at the 20 percent threshold, compared to 86 
percent in France (Faccio/Lang 2002: 379). In 2005, the mean size of the largest block-
Table 2 Proportion of listed companies where largest blockholder owns more than 50 [25] 
(20) percent of shares
1976 1984 1990 1996 2000 2005a
UK >10 5 6 [16] (>40) 2 [10] 7.3
F 55 – 50 [80] (86) 50 [70] 21.5
a 2005 data refer to the mean size of the largest blockholding in the 20 largest corporations. 
Sources: 1990 data: Becht/Mayer (2001: 2); 2000 data: van der Elst (2004); 1976–1984 data: Berglöf (1990: 
126); 2005 data: Alves (2010: 96). 
Table 3 Percentage of shares owned by the public sector
1975 1981 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2006 2007
UK 3.6 3.1 2.1 1.3 1.3 – 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 –
F – – – – – 4.2 6.9 9.1 4.7 5.8 12.5 10.3
Source: FESE (2008: 93,112).
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holding (or: mean size of combined blockholdings [in other words, the mean sum of all 
shareblocks above the 5 percent threshold]) in the largest 20 British companies was 7.3 
percent, compared to 21.5 percent in the 20 largest French companies (Alves 2010: 96).
The proportion of long-term investors (families, the state, private non-financial com-
panies) is lower in Britain than in France. Regarding family ownership, Britain in 1996 
had by far the lowest level of familial concentration in Europe, while France had the 
second-highest level (exceeded only by Portugal). The top 15 families controlled less 
than 7 percent of the total market value of common equity on the British stock mar-
ket, compared to nearly 35 percent on the French stock market. Families held only 24 
percent of controlling blocks (at the 20 percent threshold) in British listed companies, 
compared to 65 percent in French listed companies (Faccio/Lang 2002: 393).43 Since 
then, French family ownership has remained fairly stable. In 2006, 11 companies in the 
CAC 40 still had a French family as the largest strategic shareholder, compared to 12 
in 1997 (Auvray 2010). According to newspaper articles published in 2008 and 2009, 
more than half of all listed French companies, and one-third of CAC40 companies, are 
still predominantly family-owned (Guegneau 2009; Lachèvre 2008). Regarding state 
ownership: The percentage of shares owned by the British public sector (including by 
central and local government, and by other state-owned enterprises), barely exceeded 3 
percent in 1981 and has been close to zero since the mid-1990s. In France, public sector 
ownership has actually increased since the mid-1990s, from 4.2 percent in 1995 to more 
than 10 percent since 2006 (see Table 3). In 1996, the state was a controlling blockholder 
(at the 20 percent threshold) in just 0.08 percent of British listed companies, compared 
43 Moreover, 50.4 percent of UK family firms in 1996 were controlled by foreign rather than do-
mestic families, compared to 12 percent in France (Franks et al. 2012: 5).
Table 4 Percentage of shares owned by private non-financial companies
1975 1981 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2006 2007
UK 5.3 7.3 6.1 5.7 3.1 – 3.1 3.5 2.0 1.9 2.7 –
F – – – – – 31.2 23.8 18.1 19.1 20.7 12.0 13.1
Source: FESE (2008: 93,112).
Table 5 Percentage of top managersa with career experience in high level public 
administration
1981 1983 1986 1993 1996 1998 2002 2004 2006
UK – 5.3 – – – 1.7 – – –
F [37] 12.2 [34] 16.7 [50] 16.6 [46] [44] [46]
a Data for 1983 and 1993 refer to the CEOs of the domestically-owned members of the 100 largest 
industrial firms; data for 1998 refer to the entire population of main board members holding executive role 
in top 100 French and UK companies. Data in brackets refer to the CEOs of the 40 largest firms.
Sources: 1983 and 1993 data: Whittington/Mayer (2000: 114); 1998 data: MacLean/Harvey/Press (2007: 542, 
544); 1981–2006 data in brackets: Dudouet/Grémont (2007: 11).
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to 5 percent of French listed companies (Faccio/Lang 2002: 393). Some of the highest 
French performers continue to be partly state held. In 2006, 14 CAC 40 companies still 
had the state as largest strategic shareholder, up from 10 companies in 1997 (Auvray 
2010). Regarding industrial cross-shareholdings: In Britain, the proportion of shares 
held by private non-financial companies accounted for just over 7 percent in 1981 and 
has declined further since then, to less than 3 percent since 2001. In France, industrial 
cross-shareholdings have also declined, from 24 percent in 1997 to 12 percent in 2006, 
but even after this decline, they remain significantly more widespread than in the UK 
(see Table 4). 
Managerial ties to the state apparatus are also weaker in Britain than in France (see 
Table 5). In 1998, less than 2 percent of board members of the largest 100 companies 
had high level experience in public administration, compared to 16.7 percent in France 
(MacLean/Harvey/Press 2007: 542). Among CEOs of French CAC 40 companies, a ca-
reer background in public administration is even more widespread, ranging between 
34 percent in 1986 and 46 percent in 2006 (Dudouet/Grémont 2007: 11). In France, 
these ties are fostered and reinforced by a system of elite higher education in so-called 
Grands Ecoles, famously including the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), which 
is designed to train future civil servants. In 1998, 38 percent of CEOs in the 25 largest 
French companies had been trained at ENA (MacLean/Harvey/Press 2007: 542). A re-
volving door between private industry and public service operates both ways, and at the 
highest levels. Recent examples include Edmond Alphandéry, who served as Minister of 
the Economy (1993–1995) before becoming CEO of Electricité de France (EdF), and 
Francis Mer, who was CEO of the steel group Arcelor before serving as Minister of the 
Economy, Finance and Industry (2002–2004) (MacLean/Harvey/Press 2007: 542).
In sum, the data presented above are compatible with the argument that reliance on 
network-based coordination contributes to the difference in French and British atti-
tudes toward foreign takeovers. Evidence that goes beyond demonstrating a correlation 
is necessarily more anecdotal. However, as shown in the following section, occasional 
comments by employers and worker representatives also suggest a causal connection.
5 Qualitative evidence: How the degree of network-based coordination   
affects stakeholder demand for government intervention
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) is too heterogeneous for its members to 
agree on a joint stance towards foreign takeovers, not least because, unlike its German 
counterpart, it represents banks and financial institutions alongside manufacturing 
companies. 
Callaghan: Motives for Political Resistance to Foreign Takeovers 15
In the late 1980s, the organization was deeply divided over the matter. CBI president 
John Banham, broadly backed by the president’s committee, advocated a six-point plan 
for resisting unwelcome overseas bids, while the CBI companies’ committee, chaired 
by Ian Butler, resisted the proposal.44 Fears that restrictions in the UK would provoke 
protectionist countermeasures by the US had led CBI member companies Hanson 
Trust, British Airways, Woolworth, Grand Metropolitan and Maxwell to voice opposi-
tion. Maxwell even threatened to leave the CBI.45 Adjudication by the CBI council re-
sulted in a compromise.46 Two decades later, disagreement still abounded. Debates on 
protectionism featured prominently at the 2006 annual conference, with CBI chairman 
Sir John Sunderland, CBI director-general Richard Lambert and former CBI chief Sir 
Digby Jones repeatedly emphasizing the benefits of Britain’s open market for corporate 
control and holding it up as an example for other countries.47 However, when asked 
to vote, 70 percent of CBI members in the auditorium supported the proposition that 
“company ownership matters” and 84 percent believed that there is such a thing as “na-
tional champions” and “strategic assets.”48
Significantly, however, even those CBI leaders who expressed dislike for foreign take-
overs distrusted the government sufficiently to refrain from calling for direct interven-
tion. In 1987, CBI president David Nickson expressed unease about “takeovers that were 
of no long-term benefit to British industry” and warned that bidders could increasingly 
be from overseas if competition policy ignored broader public interest considerations.49 
Nevertheless, he repeatedly complained about delays caused by referrals to the Monop-
olies and Mergers Commission and called for more detailed explanations of why some 
mergers were referred while others were not.50 In 1988 and 1989, CBI director general 
John Banham advocated tougher takeover rules to protect British firms from foreign 
takeovers.51 In passionate language, he warned that Britain would otherwise turn into a 
“screwdriver economy”52 and that doing nothing would “amount to acting as pallbear-
ers at our own funeral.”53 Still, Banham explicitly rejected calls for a strategic group of 
industries which the City and the Government would defend against foreign takeovers, 
professing “zero faith” in Whitehall’s ability to spot strategic winners.54
44 The Times, February 21, 1989.
45 The Guardian, November 9 and November 11, 1988.
46 PR Newswire Europe, February 22, 1989. The compromise solution proposed and adopted was 
to demand that foreign bids be referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission if and only 
if the predator was immune to a counterbid.
47 The Daily Telegraph, November 28, 2006: 2; The Herald (Glasgow), November 28, 2006: 22; Eve-
ning Standard, December 12, 2006: 22.
48 The Daily Telegraph, November 29, 2006: 4.
49 Financial Times, March 20, 1987: 10.
50 Financial Times, October 31, 1986: 10; January 14, 1987: 6.
51 The Guardian, November 11, 1988.
52 The Times, February 21, 1989.
53 The Guardian, November 9, 1988.
54 The Times, November 8, 1988.
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By contrast, those French employers who disliked foreign takeovers did call for direct 
intervention. In 1988, “an atmosphere of panic in French boardrooms following the 
dramatic increase in takeover battles” provoked demands for better managerial defens-
es against hostile bids.55 According to a 1989 survey reported by Le Monde, 56 percent of 
CEOs of listed companies also thought that the government should be allowed to inter-
vene when French companies were attacked by non-European bidders, and 27 percent 
favored such intervention in the case of European raiders.56 In February 1989, Mitter-
rand gave a passionate televised speech against “takeover mania” in which he claimed 
to “have received several CEOs from among the ten most important French companies, 
who have asked me – as a representative of the state – for help.”57 Since then, French 
business–government coordination on questions relating to takeovers has been aided 
by the close ties between employers and several recent ministers of finance. Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn, finance minister from 1997 to 2000, 
was well-known for his proximity to the heads of French large firms. In 1993 he had founded 
the Cercle de l’Industrie, a group that brought together CEOs from the largest thirty-five com-
panies in France. … This cooperation with leaders of business did not come to an end when he 
was in government. (Culpepper 2011: 62)
Francis Mer, who led the finance ministry from 2002 to 2004, had more than thirty 
years in high corporate office behind him, including as CEO of Pont-a-Mousson and as 
president of the steel maker Usinor-Sacilor. Thierry Breton, finance minister from 2005 
to 2007, had previously chaired Thomson RCA and France Telecom.
British unions, like British managers, did not unanimously endorse economic openness. 
As one might expect, journalists writing about job cuts or takeover waves typically find 
a union spokesman ready to condemn foreign raiders. Following plant closure threats 
in 1997, The Times quotes Roger Butler, executive councilor of the Amalgamated Engi-
neering and Electrical Union, to back up the claim that “[t]rade unionists … are turn-
ing against inward investment after years of celebrating the creation of thousands of UK 
jobs by foreign companies.”58 Following a wave of foreign takeovers in 2006, The Guard-
ian quotes Peter Booth of the Transport and General Workers’ Union as saying that 
“[t]his country needs to support the principle of national champions – others have been 
doing it for years.”59 After the Cadbury takeover, The Guardian quotes Jack Dromey, the 
deputy general secretary of Unite, as calling for “a new Cadbury Law banning hostile 
takeovers of successful British companies by overseas multinationals.”60 
55 The Daily Telegraph May 14, 1988: “L’Europe des OPA.”
56 Le Monde, February 15, 1989: 46; La Vie Francaise, May 14, 1988: “L’Europe des OPA.”
57 Le Monde, February 14, 1989: 9.
58 The Times, January 20, 1997.
59 The Guardian, March 7, 2006: 29.
60 The Guardian, April 7, 2010: 26.
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Significantly, however, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) regularly asserted a welcom-
ing attitude toward foreign takeovers. Press citations of discontented union members 
are typically qualified by the proviso that “the TUC would not go that far”61 and that 
the organization was “in favour of all investments that create new jobs.”62 This prag-
matic attitude has deeper roots than simple resignation, though the latter also played a 
role.63 Some TUC officials expressed explicit appreciation of foreign takeovers. In 2006, 
Ian Brinkley, the TUC’s chief economist, declared that “foreign deals are often bet-
ter for British workers.”64 In 2009, Tim Page, the TUC’s senior policy officer, said that 
“[f]oreign owners can be better than British ones, if they invest and expand the business.”65 
Reactions to two takeover bids for Pilkington, a sheet glass manufacturer from Lan-
cashire, provide further anecdotal evidence. The first bid, in 1985, by the British-based 
conglomerate BRT, sparked massive protest. The second bid, in 2006, by Nippon Sheet 
Glass, a Japanese competitor, proceeded far more quietly. Asked about this, David Watts, 
the Labour MP for St. Helens North, explained that nowadays, “large companies like 
Pilkington are mainly controlled by London-based investors anyway and therefore the 
local link isn’t as strong as it might have been in the past.”66
These observations corroborate the hypothesis that British managers’ lesser reliance 
on network-based coordination with government officials, and British investors’ lesser 
reliance on network-based coordination with corporate stakeholders weaken the incen-
tives of stakeholders and politicians to oppose foreign takeovers. 
6 Conclusion
In sum, the paper suggests an institutionalist amendment to improve on simple ratio-
nal choice explanations of political resistance to foreign takeovers. While politicians 
everywhere face electoral incentives to favor local stakeholders over anonymous share-
holders, stakeholder opposition to foreign takeovers depends on how much of a threat 
foreign owners pose to existing structures of network-based coordination. In so-called 
outsider systems of corporate governance, including the UK, coordination takes place 
mainly through market-based mechanisms, and even domestic owners do not rely on 
networks. Political mobilization is weaker under these conditions, because networks 
61 The Guardian, October 22, 2010: 31.
62 The Times January 20, 1997.
63 For example, faced with a French bid for TBI, owner of Cardiff airport and the second largest 
company in Wales, David Jenkins, general secretary of TUC Wales, merely noted that “[t]hese 
days, it is extremely difficult to keep big companies locally owned.”
64 The Daily Telegraph, February 11, 2006: 33.
65 The Observer, September 20, 2009.
66 Daily Post (Liverpool), November 16, 2005: 8, 9.
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are worth fighting for only where they are actually in use. To the extent that short-term 
shareholder-value-oriented investment strategies are associated with Anglo-American 
investors, British workers, unlike their French, German, or Japanese counterparts, even 
have a reason to prefer foreign ownership. 
Despite emphasizing institutional variation among capitalist systems, the explanation 
advanced here challenges the optimistic assessment of international market integration 
implied by related “varieties of capitalism” arguments. Hall and Soskice (2001) influ-
entially claim that globalization benefits both liberal and coordinated market econo-
mies (LMEs and CMEs). Different degrees of reliance on network-based coordination 
are associated with comparative institutional advantages regarding different produc-
tion strategies. Economic openness is said to help countries realize mutual gains from 
trade, by allowing them to specialize on their respective strengths. I submit that this 
argument, while plausible for goods and services, does not apply to cross-border trade 
of corporate control. To the extent that takeovers disrupt network-based coordination, 
CMEs suffer asymmetrically from the removal of formal and informal barriers that still 
remain in that market. In other words, political resistance to further market integration 
is based at least partially on motives that are more rational than pride and prejudice. 
By explaining variation across countries, the paper also suggests hypotheses regarding 
change within countries over time. The corporate ownership structures that support 
network-based coordination are not cast in stone. Even Britain, though always more 
market-coordinated than France, arrived at its present outsider-oriented system of cor-
porate governance through a process of gradual change (see Scott 2003; Moran 2006). 
More recently, similar trends toward network dissolution have been noted in France 
and Germany (see Auvray 2010; Beyer/Höpner 2003). To the extent that the strength 
of networks affects attitudes to foreign investment, political resistance to foreign bids 
should decrease over time. Systematic testing is difficult because, as discussed further 
below, many other factors also influence the timing and intensity of calls for protection-
ist intervention. However, examination of British parliamentary debates since the 1950s 
does show a gradual decline in opposition, albeit not perfectly linear and clearly shaped 
by historical context (see Hees/Callaghan 2012).
By highlighting the connection between corporate ownership structures and policy 
preferences, the article also contributes to recent research on mechanisms of capitalist 
development (Streeck 2009; Callaghan 2012). To the extent that corporate takeovers 
undermine network-based coordination, the market for corporate control gradually 
eliminates its political opponents. Stable, long-term ownership relations have advan-
tages, and when these relations first come under threat, stakeholders who benefit from 
them have strong incentives to complain. However, the incentives grow weaker as the 
market expands, because once a network is destroyed, it cannot get more destroyed. 
Employees of a company that is already owned by footloose outsiders care less if their 
company is taken over by another investor of the same type. Market expansion is thus 
self-reinforcing by gradually eroding political resistance (cf. Callaghan 2012: 3).
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Apart from the institutional incentives emphasized above, economic nationalism also 
feeds on irrational sentiments that vary in intensity depending on the historical con-
text and characteristics of the companies concerned. The following aspects of takeover 
patriotism deserve further exploration. First, variation within countries merits a closer 
look. Even in France, most cross-border mergers, including those in “strategic sectors,” 
fail to provoke any political response. A case in point is the strikingly mute reaction to 
the takeover, in 2006, of Paris Euronext by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The 
dissolution of relevant network ties prior to the takeover may be part of the explanation, 
but many other factors, including endorsement of the merger by the well-connected 
CEO of the French target, and weak emotional identification of French voters with 
a company that produces no tangible good and employs no blue-collar workers, also 
played a role (see Callaghan/Lagneau-Ymonet 2012). A systematic comparison of cases 
that did elicit intervention would help assess the relative significance of network-based 
coordination as an explanatory variable.
Second, the study should be extended to other countries. Germany and the US are ob-
vious candidates because their respective structures of corporate ownership roughly 
resemble those of France and Britain. While the exceptionally low number of hostile 
bids for German companies precludes assertive statements, the public discourses sur-
rounding Pirelli’s unsuccessful bid for the German tire maker Conti in 1990 and Voda-
phone’s successful bid for Mannesmann in 2000 suggest that German politicians are 
more reluctant than their French counterparts to present themselves as “economic pa-
triots.” Instead of focusing on the nationality of the bidders, opponents of the takeovers 
took issue with the hostile nature of the bids (on Mannesmann, see Höpner/Jackson 
2006). Passionate cross-party condemnation of the hostile takeover battle between the 
German steel giants Thyssen and Krupp in 1997 (see Callaghan 2006: 104-106) attests 
to the sincerity of the latter concern. The exact nature of network-based coordination 
also differs across countries. Government and managers are the main participants in 
France, whereas coordination in Germany also involves employees. This difference 
seems likely to contribute to determining who mobilizes against foreign takeovers, on 
behalf of which companies, and to what effect.
Third, the discursive dimension of takeover patriotism deserves further exploration. 
Even in Britain, martial rhetoric and flag-waving accompanied the public discourse on 
foreign takeovers until well into the 1990s. Sir Hector Laing, chairman of United Bis-
cuits, warned the 1988 CBI conference against the danger of “selling some of our best 
weapons in the international trading war to the competitors we are doing battle with.”67 
The Independent referred to the foreign takeover of Rover in 1994 as “Britain’s industrial 
Dunkirk.”68 In protest against the bid by General Motors (GM) for British Leyland, a 
regiment of Land Rovers of every size, year, and condition paraded past the Houses 
67 Sydney Morning Herald (Australia), November 9, 1988: 46.
68 The Independent, February 21, 1994: 17.
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of Parliament with a Union Jack fluttering from each vehicle.69 In response to BMW’s 
bid for Rolls-Royce, a group of wealthy Rolls-Royce drivers sought to raise 680 million 
pounds to launch a formal counterbid. According to their spokesman, it was “unaccept-
able to every Roll-Royce and Bentley owner I have ever met for the company to pass 
into foreign ownership.”70 In the past decade, such overt manifestations of nationalism 
have become more rare – though, in 2006, Lord Sterling still felt that the sale of P&O to 
Dubai in 2006 amounted to selling the “fabric of the Empire,”71 and the Daily Mail de-
clared it “[t]ime to stand up to these invaders.”72 A systematic study of media commen-
tary, political rhetoric and parliamentary debates would provide a fuller picture of how, 
and to what effect, attitudes to foreign takeovers vary across countries and over time.
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